受歡迎的雙重過程理論認為人類思維intuitive-heuristic和demanding-analytic推理過程之間的相互作用。盡管衝突監測兩個係統的輸出是至關重要的避免決策錯誤有廣泛不同的意見過程的效率。卡尼曼(卡尼曼,d . (2002)。有限理性的地圖:一個視角直觀的判斷和選擇。諾貝爾獎講座。檢索2006年1月11日,來自http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf)和埃文斯(埃文斯,j . st . b . t . (1984)。啟發式推理和分析處理。英國心理學雜誌上的,75年,451 - 468),例如,聲稱啟發式的監測係統通常是相當寬鬆的而另一些如斯洛曼[斯洛曼s a (1996)。兩個係統的實證案例推理。心理學公報,119年,3-22]和愛潑斯坦[愛潑斯坦,美國(1994年)。 Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologists, 49, 709-724] claim it is flawless and people typically experience a struggle between what they "know" and "feel" in case of a conflict. The present study contrasted these views. Participants solved classic base rate neglect problems while thinking aloud. In these problems a stereotypical description cues a response that conflicts with the response based on the analytic base rate information. Verbal protocols showed no direct evidence for an explicitly experienced conflict. As Kahneman and Evans predicted, participants hardly ever mentioned the base rates and seemed to base their judgment exclusively on heuristic reasoning. However, more implicit measures of conflict detection such as participants' retrieval of the base rate information in an unannounced recall test, decision making latencies, and the tendency to review the base rates indicated that the base rates had been thoroughly processed. On control problems where base rates and description did not conflict this was not the case. Results suggest that whereas the popular characterization of conflict detection as an actively experienced struggle can be questioned there is nevertheless evidence for Sloman's and Epstein's basic claim about the flawless operation of the monitoring. Whenever the base rates and description disagree people will detect this conflict and consequently redirect attention towards a deeper processing of the base rates. Implications for the dual process framework and the rationality debate are discussed.